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We analyze the effect of China’s integration into the world economy on workers in
the country and show that one important channel of impact has been internal migra-
tion. Specifically, we study the changes in internal migration rates triggered by the
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that prefectures facing the average decline in trade policy uncertainty experienced a 24
percent increase in their internal in-migration rate – this result is driven by migrants
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“ ...The last three decades have witnessed the world’s ‘Great Migration’ – an
estimated 200-250 million rural residents have moved to cities and towns within
China (Chan 2012a). To put this in perspective, the volume of the Great Mi-
gration of Europeans to North America from 1800 to World War I was only a
fraction of China’s, ‘on the order of fifty million persons’ (Tilly 1976, p.58).”
(Chan 2012b, page 187).
1 Introduction
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 is one of the major
economic changes of the new century. Much has been written about the impact of this
event on the economies of China’s trading partners, for example the United States.1 In
particular, the literature provides evidence on how U.S. workers have been affected by
greater Chinese competition, for example through changes in employment rates.
In this paper we analyze the effect on workers in China.2 Our main contribution is to
show empirically that one important channel of impact on these workers has been internal
migration. Our paper is the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of internal migration
for all Chinese prefectures using individual-level Census data (to measure migration flows)
and firm-level export data (to account for the local exposure to the international trade
shock) together with an identification strategy based on plausibly exogenous variation. We
investigate the implications of a specific consequence of WTO membership – namely the
reduction in trade policy uncertainty faced by Chinese exporters to the U.S. – on internal
migration in China. We study whether we can identify a link between reduction in trade
policy uncertainty, changes in trade patterns and local labor demand, and the induced
relocation of workers across Chinese prefectures.
Understanding China’s “Great Migration” (Scheineson 2009) is important both because
of the sheer size of the phenomenon, and because of the impact it has had on China’s
economy and society. As of 2014, China’s National Bureau of Statistics estimated that 278
million individuals – or 20 percent of the country’s total population – lived outside their
1See for example Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), Handley and Limao (2017), Pierce and Schott (2016).
2Other papers focus on China as well, highlighting the important adjustments undergone by the Chinese
economy as a result of WTO accession. See for example Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott (2010), Brandt
and Morrow (2013), Cheng and Potlogea (2015), Erten and Leight (2017), Fan (2015), Kee and Tang (2016),
Tombe and Zhu (2015), Yu (2015), Wang (2015) and Zi (2016).
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home towns for at least 6 months each year. To gain perspective, if Chinese internal migrants
were a separate country, they would make up the fourth largest one in the world. Several
papers have highlighted the key role played by the geographic relocation of “surplus labor”
(Lewis 1954) in explaining productivity – and more generally – economic growth in China
(Tombe and Zhu 2015, Bond, Riezman, and Wang 2016, Li, Seok, and You 2015). Other
contributions have emphasized instead the social challenges brought about by migration:
unskilled migrant workers do not enjoy even basic labor rights, lack welfare coverage and are
systematically exposed to discrimination in the urban areas where they move (Scheineson
2009). Less instead is known on the link between changes in the trade policy environment,
and in particular trade policy uncertainty, and the relocation of workers across different
regions within China. The goal of this paper is to shed light on this important question.3
To carry out our analysis, we combine data from several sources. We construct internal
migration rates using individual-level information from, respectively, China’s 2000 popula-
tion Census and 2005 “mini” Census. Taking advantage of the detailed information in the
data, we focus on individuals who have moved from their usual residence and identify those
who have acquired the hukou (registration) in the locality where they currently reside, and
those who instead have not.4 We follow the literature and define the former as “hukou
migrants” and the latter as “non-hukou migrants”. We measure trade policy uncertainty –
faced by Chinese exporters to the U.S. – using the product-specific normal-trade-relations
(NTR) gap measure developed by Handley and Limao (2017) and Pierce and Schott (2016).
This measure is built by calculating the gap between the Most Favorite Nation (MFN) tar-
iffs applied by the United States to WTO members and the threat tariffs that would have
been implemented if MFN status was not renewed to China by the U.S. Congress (the so
called column 2 tariffs of the Smoot-Hawley Trade Act). To determine local exposure to
uncertainty, at the level of a Chinese prefecture, we follow Bartik (1991). Specifically, we
draw on export data at the firm level between 1997–1999 – i.e. before our period of investi-
gation – which we use to construct a weighted average of the NTR gap across products for
each Chinese prefecture. Additionally, we assess the robustness of our results using weights
3A few recent working papers have instead analyzed the broader question of how the Chinese economy
has adjusted to globalization. See section 2 for more details.
4Hukou is a permit issued by the Chinese government. It determines the location of registration and
work of each individual living in China, as well as access to local public services. Before the “Opening-up”
reforms in 1978, people were required to reside in their hukou registration place. But as the hukou policy
was relaxed, people were allowed to reside and work outside of their hukou registration place.
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which are based on the employment distribution in 1990.5
Our analysis delivers several interesting findings. First, we show that Chinese prefectures
facing a larger decline in trade policy uncertainty experienced larger inflows of migrant
workers. When we look at different types of migrants – hukou vs. non-hukou migrants – we
find that it is the latter who drive the changes in internal migration rates. This implies that
the labor flows triggered by the reduction in trade policy uncertainty were characterized by
a limited access of migrants to local public goods and services. Second, we investigate the
role played by one natural mechanism that could explain our main finding, namely changes
in trade flows. Taking advantage of firm-level data, we show that products and prefectures
facing a larger decline in trade policy uncertainty experienced a larger increase in exports
towards the United States.
Next, we exploit the richness of the individual-level Census data to explore heterogeneous
effects across several dimensions. In particular, we separately estimate the impact of trade
policy uncertainty reduction on skilled and unskilled migrants, migrants of different age
groups, gender and hukou status at origin (rural vs. urban). This type of analysis enables
us to examine the extent to which the trade policy shock affected different subgroups of
the population. Our results indicate that the trade shock had a larger impact on male
compared to female migrants; on migrants in prime working age, on the skilled and on
those with urban hukou at origin. At the same time we find that the main adjustment in
the case of unskilled labor has involved an increase in the number of hours worked by local
(“native”) unskilled workers. Finally, our data show that employment levels of migrants
increased following the reduction in trade policy uncertainty.6
To summarize, the greater the reduction in trade policy uncertainty in a prefecture, the
higher the increase in migration rate to that prefecture – of non-hukou migrants and of
skilled migrants – and the higher the increase in the number of hours worked by unskilled
native workers. Hence our analysis indicates that the adjustment has taken place through
changes in migration, for skilled labor, and through changes in the number of hours worked
for unskilled labor. In general, the main contribution of our paper is to provide new results
on the labor-market adjustment of local economies to trade policy changes, in particular
highlighting the importance of internal migration. Our results suggest that one way China
5The information is taken from China’s 1990 population Census.
6There was though no significant effect on employment rates of neither migrants nor native workers
(neither skilled nor unskilled).
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has been able to reap the benefits of trade openness has been through a more efficient geo-
graphic allocation of (skilled) workers. Hence this is yet another example of how migration
facilitates economic development and growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how our paper
fits into the existing literature. In Section 3 we provide additional context for our analysis,
focusing on internal labor mobility in China and the change in the trade policy environment
after 2001. Section 4 describes our data, whereas Section 5 presents the empirical strategy
and main findings. Section 6 presents additional results and robustness checks, and Section
7 examines the effect of the trade shock on alternative labor market adjustment mechanisms.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to three areas of research. First, it contributes to the growing literature
on the regional economic impact of trade-induced shocks.7 These studies typically quantify
the size of the shock using a weighted average of changes in trade policy, with weights based
on the industrial or factor endowments distribution in each region within a country, and
explore the spatial consequences of the trade policy changes. Most of these papers focus
on the relaxation of a country’s own aggregate trade policy (such as a decrease in import
tariff rates). Identification of the causal effect of trade liberalization on the outcome of
interest relies on the assumption that changes in protection constructed at the local level
are exogenous. This assumption might be satisfied in some specific circumstances but, as
the literature on the political economy of trade policy has argued, domestic forces do play
an important role in shaping the cross–sectional distribution of trade protection and these
forces may have a geographical component. The recent analysis by McCaig (2011) of poverty
and internal migration in Vietnam represents an exception, as the source of the shock is
an exogenous trade policy change implemented by an important trading partner, the U.S.
(the 2001 extension of MFN treatment to Vietnamese imports). McCaig (2011) finds that
provinces more exposed to U.S. tariff cuts experienced a faster decline in poverty, but he
7For example, for poverty see Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005, Topalova 2007, Topalova 2010, Edmonds,
Pavcnik, and Topalova 2010; for labor market outcomes see Goldberg and Pavcnik 2005, McCaig 2011,
Hasan, Mitra, Ranjan, and Ahsan 2012, Kovak 2013, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013, Monte 2016, etc.; for
the persistency of the effects of the shocks see Dix–Carneiro and Kovak 2017 and Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and
Song 2014; for a recent review of the literature see Pavcnik 2017.
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documents only modest effects on internal migration flows, especially among low skilled
individuals. Our analysis also exploits variation in the trade policy of a partner country
and not of the country of interest – but in our paper the shock involves a reduction in the
trade policy uncertainty in addition to a change in tariffs.
Our work is also closely related to two recent papers that focus on China’s accession to
the WTO as a source of reduction in trade policy uncertainty. Handley and Limao (2017)
develop and calibrate a dynamic general equilibrium model in which policy uncertainty
crucially affects the incentives to undertake a costly export investment decision. In a related
paper, Pierce and Schott (2016) use a difference in difference empirical design to examine
the link between the sharp drop in U.S. manufacturing employment beginning in 2001 and
China’s accession to the WTO. They find that products where the threat of tariff hikes
declines the most experience larger increases in the value of imports from China and more
severe employment losses. Note that another recent contribution to the literature, Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013) examine a related set of issues but uses a different source of
exogenous variation.8
As in Handley and Limao (2017) and Pierce and Schott (2016), our analysis takes
advantage of the reduction in trade policy uncertainty faced by Chinese exporters in the
U.S., derived from the change in MFN status – from temporary to permanent – granted by
the U.S. to China in 2001. Hence the variation across products exploited in the empirical
analysis – which is driven by differences between non-MFN and MFN tariff rates – is most
likely exogenous since non-MFN tariff rates were set by the United States in the 1930’s.
While Handley and Limao (2017), Pierce and Schott (2016) and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson
(2013) consider impacts on the U.S. economy and specifically on U.S. workers, our analysis
focuses on the effect that the reduction in trade policy uncertainty had on workers in China,
mainly through the internal migration channel.
More directly related to our work are a few recent papers that investigate the link
between trade liberalization and factor market adjustments in China. Our main innovation
compared to these papers is to provide a comprehensive analysis of internal migration for
all Chinese prefectures, based on individual-level data (to measure migration flows) – rather
8The authors analyze the impact of rising Chinese import competition (per worker) between 1990 and
2007 on U.S. local labor markets (defined at the commuting zone (CZ) level). The empirical analysis exploits
variation across CZs and over time in exposure to Chinese import competition driven by, respectively, initial
differences in industry specialization across CZs and changes in U.S. aggregate imports from China by
industry, instrumented with changes in imports from China to other high-income countries.
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than yearbook tabulations – and detailed firm-level export data (to construct trade weights
that account for the local exposure to the international trade shock), together with an
identification strategy based on plausibly exogenous variation. In addition, as discussed
before, the micro detail of our data allows us to explore heterogeneous effects.
Using the same identification strategy as in this paper, Erten and Leight (2017) and
Cheng and Potlogea (2015) investigate the local development impact, on multiple outcome
variables, of the elimination of the threat of MFN non-renewal by the U.S. to China. One
of the outcome variables in the two papers is changes in population stocks, interpreted as a
proxy for internal migration. The first paper focuses on the impact on structural transfor-
mation; the second on the urbanization process. Erten and Leight (2017) find that localities
more exposed to the reduction in trade policy uncertainty experience increased exports and
foreign direct investment, an increase in overall GDP, a decline in agricultural employment
and an increase in employment in the manufacturing (secondary) sector. They also find
a modest increase in the total county population. Cheng and Potlogea (2015) uncover
instead an increase in urbanization, output, employment, investment and FDI flows, and
no impact on wages. Both papers use existing data compilations (yearbooks), rather than
the individual-level data used in our analysis. The level of the analysis also differs from
ours: while Erten and Leight (2017) focus on counties,9 Cheng and Potlogea (2015) exploit
instead variation at the level of the urban ward of a prefecture–level city. In the absence
of an official definition of local labor markets by China’s Statistical agency10 both perspec-
tives are informative but importantly the two papers do not cover all of China11 and thus
they cannot capture the full extent of internal migration in the country. Furthermore, the
authors only provide indirect evidence on internal migration, based on population growth
regressions. Using changes in population stocks as a proxy for migration is problematic as
these changes are affected not only by migration, but also by other factors such as fertility
and mortality, which are likely to differ across space due to a variety of reasons. Finally,
the data available in the county level Census tabulations for this period refer only to the
number of official residents, i.e. people with local hukou. Hence, the analyses based on
these data cannot measure the movement of non-hukou migrants, which represents by far
9In 2005, there were a total of 2862 counties in China.
10For more on this issue see our discussion in section 4.1.
11For example, in Erten and Leight (2017) data on aggregate exports pattern are available only for less
than half of the counties; see Table 2, column 1 in the paper; Cheng and Potlogea (2015) have instead data
for at most 226 prefectures, out of a total of 344 prefecture level units.
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the largest component of internal migration in this period. Thus, the strength of our paper
is to use individual-level data taken from the Chinese population Census to construct direct
measures of migration, and to match them with firm-level export data. This allows us to
analyse all of China and to explore a rich set of heterogeneous effects, which cannot be
studied with more aggregated data.
Focusing on trade in intermediate products, Zi (2016) studies the effect of the liber-
alization of Chinese trade policy on the location of economic activity across the country
and how it leads to changes in the restrictiveness of the hukou system across provinces.12
Using fixed effects models, she uncovers a series of interesting correlations which are then
used to develop a quantitative framework and assess the welfare effects of the liberaliza-
tion. Interestingly, she finds that the relatively small direct welfare gains induced by trade
liberalization could be significantly magnified by the elimination of the hukou system. In
a closely related paper, Wang (2015) develops a heterogeneous-firms trade model to study
the effect of increased exports on patterns of employment and migration. The empirical
analysis uses prefecture-level information from Census tabulations. The main result from
the IV specification is that greater exports led to a significant decline in agricultural em-
ployment over the 2000-2010 period, as well as to increased internal migration. While her
results are in line with ours, the identification is different and potentially more vulnerable
to endogeneity concerns.
Tombe and Zhu (2015) develop and calibrate a two–sector, multiple–region general equi-
librium model with interregional trade and labor mobility distortions to study the effect of
changes in trade and internal migration costs on total factor productivity growth in China
around its entry into the WTO. Based on a growth accounting exercise, the authors con-
clude that about half of the observed total labor productivity growth can be attributed to
the decline in trade and migration costs observed in the period. Moreover, the observed
more efficient allocation of labor across Chinese prefectures explains about twenty percent
of total TFP growth. In a related paper, Fan (2015) develops and calibrates a multi-factor
general equilibrium model to investigate the relationship between changes in trade and in-
ternal migration costs and income inequality both between and within regions in China.
Lower trade costs increase inequality both across different regions and across different skill
12The measure is based on estimated fixed effects from a regression explaining the individual-level prob-
ability of obtaining local hukou in 2000. For a recent analysis of the effects of trade liberalization on local
hukou regulations, see Tian 2018.
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groups, with the former playing a role that is twice as big as the latter. At the same time,
labor mobility plays an important role in shaping the geography of inequality within China.
In particular, skill related differences in mobility costs make it easier for skilled workers
compared to unskilled workers to relocate across prefectures, hence they tend to reduce
inequality within coastal areas receiving large inflows of migrants, while making inequality
more severe in the interior regions. Compared to Tombe and Zhu (2015) and Fan (2015),
we focus on similar issues but use a different methodological approach – since we estimate
an empirical model and provide evidence on a causal effect.
To conclude, while some papers offer evidence on the same topic, our comprehensive
analysis of internal migration for all Chinese prefectures using individual-level Census data
and firm-level export data, combined with an established identification strategy, sets our
paper apart from existing work. In addition, our results provide evidence on many het-
erogeneous effects, for example by differentiating between hukou vs. non-hukou migrants,
skilled vs. unskilled migrants, male vs. female migrants as well as old vs. young migrants.
3 Background and Context
3.1 Hukou and internal migration
For some time, China has carried out an active and restrictive internal migration policy.
While in most countries citizens are free to move internally, the Chinese Household Reg-
istration System – known as the hukou system – imposes substantial limits to internal
migration. Hukou is a permit issued by the Chinese government, which determines the lo-
cation of registration (permanent residence) and work of each individual living in China. In
addition, hukou entitles its holder to local social welfare programs, such as public education
and healthcare, as well as pensions. Importantly, hukou is given on a family basis and in
particular newborns inherit hukou location and type from their mother. Hence hukou is
akin to jus sanguinis in Western countries’ citizenship laws as it links the right to live, work
and access public services in a given location to blood relationships.
Two attributes characterize the hukou system: the type (leibie) and the location (suozaidi).
The leibie broadly categorizes individuals as “rural” or “urban” residents, identifying the
two-tier welfare system available to them.13 In our main results the dimension of the hukou
13In the early period of the system (1960s-1980s), the “urban” (non-agricultural) hukou entitled the holder
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system we focus on is the location of registration (suozaidi).14 When the system was strictly
applied (until 1978), it prohibited Chinese individuals to move to and work in locations other
than one’s hukou registration place. In that period any change in hukou status required
approval by the central government. Approval rates were very low and almost all Chinese
citizens remained in their de jure location of registration. With the beginning of Deng Xi-
aoping’s “Opening Up” reforms in 1978, demand for labor in the rapidly growing industries
in the cities started to pick up. Since then policy makers have become increasingly aware
that the system is an impediment to economic development, hence the extent to which the
hukou system is enforced has significantly declined. First, individuals can now move to and
work in locations which are different from their hukou registration place as long as they
can support themselves, since they do not have access to local public services. In addition,
State Council directives were issued in 1992 and 1998 which gave city authorities the power
to grant local hukou to select groups of individuals – typically investors and highly edu-
cated workers.15 In general, though, restrictions on long-term migration remain, limiting
the ability of migrants to relocate and significantly affecting their behavior (Meng and Xue
2017).
3.2 Trade liberalization
After fifteen years of intense negotiations, China joined the WTO in December 2001, herald-
ing a golden decade of rapid economic growth. China’s entry in the WTO gave rise to
significant trade policy changes and created a more predictable trade policy environment.
In fact, while Japan and the EU had already granted China permanent MFN status in
respectively 1974 and 1980, the 1980 U.S. decision to grant the country MFN status was
subject to yearly renewal. The latter was far from certain, and was subject to a contentious
political process which created substantial uncertainty in the tariff rates Chinese exporters
to a wide array of state-provided services (housing, employment, grain rations, education and medical care),
while the “rural” (agricultural) hukou population was expected to be mainly self sufficient, receiving very
limited, if any, state transfers. Afterwards, the population with rural hukou began receiving very limited
welfare benefits in their hukou location.
14Our main results do not differentiate according to the type of hukou since both rural and urban non-
hukou migrants have no access to local public services, while hukou migrants typically hold urban type. In
additional results, we analyze migration by hukou at origin (rural vs. urban), see Table 9, Panel C.
15The directives also allowed the elimination of the distinction between rural and urban hukou. Still, the
take up rate varied significantly and only a few provincial administrative units (e.g. Guangdong, Zhejiang,
Shanghai, Hebei, Henan and Jiangsu) announced in the early 2000s that they would eliminate this distinction
within some towns/county level cities.
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would face in the US market.16 In fact, in the 1990s, a bill was put before Congress every
year to revoke MFN status to China. If enacted, these bills would have led to the applica-
tion of the Smoot Hawley tariffs – i.e., they would have led to a significant increase in trade
costs for Chinese exporters. In fact, by 2000 the average MFN tariff was only 4%, whereas
if China had lost MFN status, it would have faced a 35% average tariff on its exports to
the United States. While China’s normal trade relation status with the U.S. has never
been revoked, and Chinese exports have enjoyed MFN tariff rates in the U.S. between 1980
and 2000, the uncertainty induced by China’s conditional MFN status was substantial, and
the existing literature has shown that its elimination had a significant impact on the U.S.
economy (Handley and Limao 2017, Pierce and Schott 2016). More specifically, there is
evidence that China’s entry into the WTO had an effect on subsequent employment growth
in the U.S. manufacturing sector, and that this effect varied with the extent to which tariff
uncertainty was affected. Pierce and Schott (2016) find that China’s accession to the WTO
led to a 3 – 4 percentage points decline in employment growth in U.S. manufacturing in the
short run, and to a 12 –16 percentage points decline in the medium run.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To carry out the empirical analysis, we combine data from a variety of different sources.
In particular, we use 1) individual-level data from China’s population Census to construct
measures of internal migration, and 2) firm-level trade data to construct measures of exports
at the product and prefecture levels. To capture the aggregate trade policy stance, we use
tariff data from the World Integrated Trading System database and combine them with
information on trade policy uncertainty vis a vis the United States, the pervasiveness of
barriers to investment in China, the incidence of the U.S. Multi Fiber Agreement (MFA)
quota, and the availability of production subsidies to Chinese firms. We aggregate these
detailed micro–data to construct a prefecture–level panel dataset. The remainder of this
section outlines the main steps we follow to construct the dependent variable and the key
explanatory variables. The Data Appendix contains more detailed information on the data
sources.
16For a more detailed description, see Handley and Limao (2017), and Pierce and Schott (2016).
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4.1 Migration measures
Prior to defining the relevant migration measures used in this paper, we provide a brief
description of the structure of local government in China. There are 31 provincial-level
units, including 27 provinces and 4 provincial-level municipalities. The tree graph in Figure
A.1 illustrates the administrative structure of a province. Each province can be additionally
divided into prefectures.17 Including the provincial municipalities mentioned above, there
were 326 prefecture-level units in China in 1990.18 Each prefecture consists of a prefecture-
level city (PLC), i.e. a municipality with governing rights, and of a group of subordinate
counties.
The hukou system mandates that all citizens of China are registered at a specific address
detailed to the street number. For example, a person’s hukou registration place can be “No.
100 City Rd., Apt 222, Old town District, Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province, China”. When
the hukou system was introduced, it was designed to keep track of population movements.
Since hukou registrations are detailed to street numbers, even simple address changes within
a county require altering one’s registration record. Changing hukou location within a county
is usually simple and is much easier than changing hukou location across counties and larger
administrative units (such as prefectures and provinces), which is instead subject to the
destination in-migration policies. Our measure of internal migration is based on individual-
level information on hukou registrations, as reported in Census data.19
For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on prefectures as the unit of observation and
use the 1990 delineation of prefectures, so that the sample of prefectures is the same in
the main analysis, the pre-trend analysis and the falsification exercise – but results are
robust if we use the 2000 delineation (see Appendix C: Supplementary Results). While the
Chinese statistical office does not provide a geographic definition of a “local labor market”,
there are two reasons for our choice of the prefecture as a proxy for this concept. First,
17The 4 provincial-level municipalities include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing. Even though
they resemble expanded metropolitan areas, they correspond to the same administrative level as provinces,
thus we treat them as collections of prefectures in our analysis. For example, Shanghai consists of 2 “pre-
fectures”: Shanghai Municipal District and Shanghai Counties.
18Our final sample includes 322 of them: 3 “prefectures” are dropped from the analysis because they
are groups of non-contiguous counties under direct provincial administration (Xinjiang province, Hainan
province, and Hubei province have such areas). Another prefecture – Yunnan, Yuxi – was dropped after
running our test for outliers. Including these outliers in the analysis does not affect our results. Note that
in 2000 the number of prefectures increased to 344.
19In the Census only people who stayed in a location longer than six months report their hukou status,
thus temporary visitors are not included in our measure.
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as pointed out by Xue and Zhang (2001) and Zi (2016), much of the planning of public
transportation is carried out at the prefecture level and, for this reason, counties within the
same prefecture are likely to have strong commuting ties and be economically integrated.
As such counties cannot be considered distinct local labor markets. In general counties are
quite small, that is why commuting is likely to take place across them.20 Second, during the
period we consider in our analysis, county boundaries have changed significantly, whereas
prefectures have been much more stable.21 In addition, data on aggregate export patterns
are available only for less than half of China’s counties. Using prefectures as the unit of
analysis allows us to track the same geographic unit over time and to cover all of China in
our analysis.
We focus on cross-prefecture migration and ignore within-prefecture moves. As a result,
in our study (internal) migrants are individuals who move across prefectures. In addi-
tion, migrants are those who have arrived in their destination in the previous five years.22
Depending on whether or not a migrant gains permanent residence in the destination pre-
fecture, we will distinguish between “hukou” and “non-hukou” migrants.23 In addition, we
focus on working-age (16-65 years old) employed migrant workers. In the main analysis we
look at the sample of male migrants, since they are less likely to exit the labor force for
family reasons, but in the summary statistics (Table 1) and additional results (Section 6.3)
we also consider the sample of female migrants. More precisely:
1. A “non-hukou” migrant is an individual who resides in a prefecture without the local
hukou. They can be identified from the Census data using information under “Reg-
istration Status”: anyone, in any location, whose registration status appears to be
“registered elsewhere”, is a non-hukou in-migrant in their current location. Note that
we can further distinguish within–province non-hukou migration and cross-province
non-hukou migration. Within-province non-hukou migration happens as individuals
move to another prefecture within a province. Cross-province non-hukou migration
occurs if the migrant crosses the provincial borders.
2. A “hukou” migrant is an individual who relocated to a different prefecture and trans-
20Note that the median Chinese county is only one fifth the size of a U.S. commuting zone, whereas the
median Chinese prefecture is about 40 percent larger than the corresponding U.S. commuting zone.
21Between 2000 and 2005, the number of counties increased from 2411 to 2862, making county-level
comparisons over time challenging.
22We use residence five years ago since it is a question consistently used across Census waves.
23A more detailed explanation of migrant definitions can be found in Appendix A.
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ferred hukou registration to the destination residence. Since information on location
of previous hukou is not available in the Census, the identification of hukou migrants
requires a set of plausible assumptions. In particular, we can observe only individuals’
current hukou registration place and where they lived previously, but not where their
hukou was registered previously. As a result, we assume those locally registered resi-
dents who report a different residence 5 years ago to have transferred their hukou to
the current locality; in other words, hukou migrants are currently registered residents
who moved and changed their registration in the last 5 years. If the new residence
is in the same province or in another province, respectively, then the corresponding
migration is denoted as within–province or cross–province hukou migration. However,
note that we only have data for cross–province hukou migration due to changes in the
2005 Census questionnaire.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the national-level numbers and rates of total
(hukou plus non-hukou) internal migration in 1990, 2000 and 2005,24 where we focus on
16-65 year-old employed workers. Total migration includes cross-prefecture non-hukou mi-
gration plus cross-province hukou migration. The first three rows in each panel present the
total counts of migrants, whereas the last three rows in each panel present the shares of
migrants in the employed population.
Only about 17.8 million employed individuals migrated across prefectures between 1985
and 1990, representing 2.7 percent of the employed population aged 16-65. Migration in
this period is gender biased, as about 57 percent of the migrants are males. Not surpris-
ingly, as China relaxed its internal migration policy in the 1990’s, internal migration nearly
quadrupled in the next 15 years. Between 1995 and 2000, approximately 51.7 million em-
ployed individuals changed their prefecture of residence. Migration in this period is still
gender-biased. Five-year mobility rates hover around 7.8 percent, a figure that is lower than
in the United States (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011) in the same period. Interestingly,
mobility increased even more over the following five years, when approximately 66.7 million
employed individuals changed prefecture of residence. The gender-bias appears to be stable,
while the five-year mobility rate increased to approximately 9.9 percent.
24The 1990, 2000 and 2005 population Census of China document detailed individual-level information on
gender, age, education level, migration history, employment status, as well as other labor market attributes.
We concord prefectures across 3 Census waves, and aggregate the individual level data to prefecture cells.
14
Using educational attainment from the population Census, we can also distinguish be-
tween skilled and unskilled migrants. Following the literature (Ge and Yang 2014), we
divide the sample into two skill groups, and identify as skilled workers those who have at
least a high school degree. Comparing across the three panels, unskilled migrants were
always in greater numbers, in addition unskilled workers were increasingly more likely to
move compared to skilled ones over time. More specifically, in 1985-1990, skilled workers
were 2.16 times more likely to move across prefectures than unskilled ones, while in 1995-
2000 and 2000-2005 respectively, skilled workers were only 1.22 times and 1.65 times more
likely to move across prefectures than unskilled ones.
Figures 1a – 1b illustrate the geographic distribution of migration flows. The maps
delineate China’s prefectures and color code each of them using the share of recent total
(non-hukou plus hukou) migrants among the employed population. Several interesting pat-
terns emerge. First, the coastal prefectures of South–Eastern China are major destinations
of migration flows. Among these destinations, two major economic zones (Yangtze River
Delta region, and Pearl River Delta region) have the highest migration rates. In particular,
very high internal migration rates are observed for instance in the prefectures surrounding
Hangzhou Bay in the Yangtze River Delta region. In 2005, Shanghai had a total migration
rate of 44.89%, Hangzhou and Ningbo had total migration rates of 24.34% and 41.70%,
respectively. Prefectures in the Pearl River Delta region also have high migration rates.
In 2000, Dongguan’s total migration rate was 83.76%, Guangzhou’s and Shenzhen’s were
44.79% and 88.70%, respectively.25 Second, migration flows are high also in several prefec-
tures in the North East and in a few prefectures in the West.26 Beijing and Tianjin are
major migration destinations in the Bohai Bay Region and so are a few prefectures in the
three Northeastern Provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning), such as Dalian (in 2005 re-
cent in-migrants represented 17.20% of the total population) and Daqing (10.10%). Third,
central China does not appear to be a major migrant destination, with the exception of a
few urban prefectures, such as Chengdu in Sichuan province (10.08% in 2005) and Xi’an in
Shaanxi province (12.97% in 2005).
25As one of the major manufacturing hubs in Guangdong province, Dongguan is considered progressive
in seeking foreign direct investment and is also known for migrant-labor-fueled factories. According to
Dongguan city’s estimate, at the end of 2008, there were 5.2 millions of migrants in its population of 6.9
million.
26The high migration prefectures in the Northwest are mainly oil-producing desert cities (Fan 2015) and
prefecture-level jurisdictions in Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.
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Comparing migration patterns over time, we can see some interesting changes. Figure 2a
color-codes the increase in in-migration rates from 2000 to 2005. The lighter regions experi-
enced a decline in in-migration rates, whereas the darker regions experienced an increase in
in-migrant rates over time. For instance, in-migration increased in the South Eastern part
of the country, and in particular several additional prefectures became destinations of large
new migrant arrivals. The total migration rate in Huainan (Anhui province) increased from
5.33% in 2000 to 17.82% in 2005, and that of Zhoushan (Zhejiang province) from 6.60% in
2000 to 18.07% in 2005. The same holds true for several prefectures in the North East of
the country. For example, Tianjin’s total migration rate increased from 9.53% in 2000 to
17.97% in 2005, and that of Shenyang (Liaoning province) from 7.37% in 2000 to 14.27%
in 2005.
4.2 NTR gap
Our key explanatory variable captures the reduction in the trade policy uncertainty, faced
by Chinese exporters vis a vis the United States, as a result of China’s entry in the WTO.
Following Pierce and Schott (2016), we measure it using the Normal Trade Relations (NTR)
gap. The latter is defined as the difference between the Normal Trade Relations (NTR)
tariffs, reserved to WTO members and applied to China’s exports to the U.S. since the early
eighties, and the non–NTR rates, which are instead the higher tariff rates applied to non-
market economies and originally established under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act introduced
in 1930. The latter would have been applied to China if Congress failed to extend MFN
status to China in any year before China’s entry in the WTO. More precisely, the NTR gap
for product i is defined as:
NTR gapi = non NTR ratei −NTR ratei
We construct the NTR gap using data on NTR rates for 1999, i.e. before China’s WTO
accession. Table 2 shows that the average NTR gap is substantial at over 31 percentage
points. Furthermore, it is higher for unskilled-labor intensive goods (35 percentage points)
than for skilled-labor intensive goods (27 percentage points).27 Figure 3 illustrates the dis-
tribution of NTR gaps across product types and shows substantial variation. For example,
27Skilled labor intensive goods are those characterized by a higher than average skill intensity. See Ap-
pendix B.2 for more details on how this variable has been constructed.
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“Binoculars” (product 900510) are characterized by an NTR gap of 60%, whereas “Other
woven fabrics of silk” (product 500720) exhibit an NTR gap of 90%. At the same time,
“Ginseng roots” (product 121120) is among the 448 products for which China’s entry in
the WTO did not have an impact, i.e. it is characterized by a zero NTR gap.
To carry out the empirical analysis, we aggregate the product-level NTR gap measure at
the prefecture-level using as weights the product shares in the export basket of each Chinese
prefecture, as observed over the period 1997-1999, i.e. before China’s accession to the WTO.
In other words we follow Bartik (1991) to construct a local measure, at the prefecture level,
of the NTR gap.28 To construct the weights, we use the firm-level export information avail-
able in China’s Customs Data, which allows us to build a product/prefecture/destination
dataset. In our baseline analysis we construct the weights using exports to the U.S., but in
robustness checks in Table 6 we also consider alternative weighting schemes. Specifically,







where Expij are the exports of good i from prefecture j and Expj are total exports of the
prefecture.
Figure 2b offers a snapshot of the NTR gap by prefecture, constructed using exports
to the U.S. as weights. As can be immediately seen, NTR gaps are higher in the South-
Eastern coastal region (Shaoxing in Zhejiang province has an NTR gap of 45.45%, whereas
Chaozhou in Guangdong province has an NTR gap of 41.66%), but several prefectures in
Central China do also exhibit very high NTR gaps (for example, Nanchong and Guangyuan
located in Sichuan province have NTR gaps of 42.34% and 38.98%, respectively).
4.3 Other controls
Between 2000 and 2005 China experienced other changes in trade and other policies, both
at home and abroad, which might have contributed to the increase in demand for labor and
internal mobility. Since these other changes might be correlated with our main explanatory
variable, we will investigate whether accounting for their impact affects the estimated effect
28Note that it is not possible to construct export baskets at the prefecture level for years before 1997 since
data are not available before then at a disaggregate level. However we assess the robustness of our results
using employment weights based on the 1990 Census.
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of the reduction in trade policy uncertainty. Moreover, we also want to explore whether
these other policy changes are additional important drivers of internal migration within
China in this period. Following the literature, and in particular Pierce and Schott (2016),
the additional policy controls include NTR rates, tariffs abroad, import tariffs, barriers
to investment in China, MFA quota restrictions, production subsidies and export licenses.
We aggregate these measures from product/industry/firm level to the prefecture level, as
described below. Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Table 2.
The most direct way that trade policy affects the labor demand in a prefecture is through
tariff rates. To account for the effect of tariff restrictions faced by Chinese exporters abroad,
we construct two measures. The first, the NTR rate is the weighted average – across prod-
ucts – of the tariff rates applied by the United States to countries granted MFN status. The
second, Tariff Abroad, is the weighted average of tariff rates across products and export des-
tinations. For both measures, we use as weights the export shares in the prefecture’s export
basket in 1997-1999, respectively, to the United States and to the other top destinations of
Chinese exports at the national level (Hong Kong, Japan, European Union, South Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan, Australia, Canada, and Russia).29 We also want to control for changes
in a prefecture’s demand for labor due to China’s own tariffs. We construct the variable
Import tariff, which is the weighted average of tariff rates across products and imports’
origin countries, where the weights are the import shares in the prefecture’s import basket,
which we construct using the 1997 - 1999 transaction-level custom data.
China is a major destination of foreign direct investment (FDI) which, according to sev-
eral studies, has played an important role in promoting local development (Chen, Chang,
and Zhang 1995). To account for the increase in labor demand through this channel, we
use a proxy for barriers to investment based on the Contract Intensity measure proposed by
Nunn (2007). The latter describes the share of intermediate inputs used by a firm that re-
quires relationship-specific investments by the supplier. The higher the contract intensity of
firms, the more difficult it was for foreign firms to deal with imperfect contract enforcement
in China before 2001. As China joined the WTO, some of these contract enforcement prob-
lems could be resolved within the GATT/WTO system (for example, through the dispute
settlement mechanism). As a result, after 2001, prefectures characterized by exported prod-
ucts with higher contract intensity disproportionately benefited. Our measure of Contract
29Exports to these countries represents 77% of Chinese exports between 1997-1999.
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Intensity at the prefecture level is equal to the weighted average across products exported
by the prefecture.
From 2000 to 2005, an additional potential driver of increased labor demand was repre-
sented by the phasing out of quota restrictions on U.S. apparel and textile imports under
the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) and the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC).
Upon joining the WTO at the end of 2000, China became eligible for the elimination of
these non-tariff barriers. Following Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott (2010), we calculate
the share of China’s clothing and textile exports which faced binding MFA quotas in the
U.S. at the HS 6-digit level.30 To measure the extent to which each Chinese prefecture was
affected by the relaxation of MFA quotas, we aggregate the HS level MFA Quota Bound
to the prefecture level using each prefecture’s export basket. The resulting prefecture-level
variable MFA Quota Bound measures the share of textile exports that would have faced
binding MFA quotas after 2001, were not for China’s WTO accession. Prefectures with a
larger textile export sector, which faced more stringent MFA quotas before 2001, saw bigger
non-tariff-barrier reductions through this channel as China joined the WTO.
Note that Chinese exporters benefit from a series of government subsidies which again
are likely to affect the level of economic activity and demand for labor in a prefecture. For
example, Defever and Riaño (2017) document that until 2008, foreign-owned firms in China
that exported over 70% of their production enjoyed a 50% reduction in the corporate income
tax rate. By locating in one of the numerous special economic zones, firms could benefit
from an even lower tax rate.31 China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (CASIF) reports
the subsidy-per-sales ratio of each firm. We aggregate the geocoded firm-level data to
calculate the average subsidy-per-sales ratio for each prefecture. Hence the prefecture-level
time-varying Production Subsidy variable measures the share of prefecture-level production
which is subsidized.
Finally, prior to China’s accession to the WTO, there were significant restrictions on
direct exporting, and firms which were not granted export licenses were required to export
through intermediaries. As China joined the WTO, these restrictions were gradually phased
30Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott (2010) provide a crosswalk between 149 three-digit MFA product
groups and HS codes.
31Additional benefits included VAT rebates and lower tariffs on imported machinery and intermediate
inputs, direct cash subsidies, discounted utility and land rental rates and easier access to finance. Defever
and Riaño (2017) find that, as a direct consequence of these subsidies, over a third of Chinese manufacturing
exporters sell more than 90% of their products abroad.
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out and all firms became eligible to export directly by 2004 (Bai, Krishna, and Ma 2017).
The phasing out of the export licensing requirement likely contributed to increased demand
for migrant labor in prefectures with high concentration of indirect exporters. To account for
this important policy change, we have constructed a prefecture-level time-varying measure
of Export License, capturing the share of manufacturing employment hired by firms with
export licenses. To identify firms enjoying direct access to a foreign market, we have matched
firms observed in the CASIF to those in the Chinese Customs Data. In particular, firms
reporting positive export values in both data sets in a given year were classified as having an
export license, whereas firms reporting positive export values only in CASIF were classified
as indirect exporters – i.e. without access to an export license in that year.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Empirical specification
We are interested in studying the effect of the reduction in trade policy uncertainty faced by
a prefecture on that prefecture’s migrant inflows. In particular, we ask whether prefectures
with bigger NTR gaps (and thus bigger uncertainty reduction in tariff rates due to WTO
accession) experienced larger migrant inflows after China’s WTO accession, compared to
prefectures with smaller NTR gaps. To answer this question, we implement a difference-
in-difference estimation strategy. The first difference exploits variation over time, that is,
pre- and post-WTO accession, as China’s WTO accession provides variation (reduction) in
tariff uncertainty over time. In addition, Chinese prefectures differ in their exposure to tariff
uncertainty reduction according to the composition of their export baskets prior to China’s
WTO accession. Thus the second difference we exploit is cross-sectional, specifically between
the high NTR-gap prefectures (more intensely treated) and the low-NTR gap prefectures
(less intensely treated). Note that the treatment is a continuous variables. We model
the impact of changes in other policies in a similar way within a difference-in-difference
framework. The prefecture-level panel data set described in the previous section provides
the variation used to identify the effects. Our baseline specification is given by:
Mjt = α+ β1 · Postt ·NTR Gapj + β2 · Postt ·Xj + β3 · Postt + δj + εjt (1)
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where Mjt is our measure of migrant inflows, specifically the share of (employed male)
migrants in the total (employed male) population of prefecture j at year t (t = {2000, 2005}).
32 NTR Gapj measures the time-invariant uncertainty in trade barriers with the U.S.
faced by each prefecture before WTO accession. Xj is a vector that contains reductions
between 2000 and 2005 in tariff rates faced by Chinese exporters abroad (∆NTR rate and
∆Tariff Abroad) and in Chinese import tariff rates (∆Import tariff). We also include in
Xj other time-invariant measures of barriers to trade and investment that were relaxed
as China acceded to the WTO, namely Contract Intensity and the MFA Quota Bound.
Note that Xj also includes the reduction between 2000 and 2005 of Chinese production
subsidies, i.e. ∆Production Subsidy, and the increase over the same period of the share
of manufacturing employment hired by firms with export licenses, i.e. ∆Export License.33
The direct effect of the Postt dummy controls for changes in migrant inflows between 2000
and 2005, which are common across all prefectures. We also net out the (direct) effect of
time-invariant prefecture characteristics with a set of prefecture fixed effects denoted as δj .
β1 is the main coefficient of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level
in all of our specifications.34 Everything else equal, a positive value of β1 in Equation (1)
suggests that the reduction in uncertainty on U.S. tariff rates is associated with an increase
in migrant inflows relative to the common time trend. Similarly for the other coefficients,
a positive value suggests that – for example – a reduction in tariffs abroad or in Chinese
tariffs is associated with higher migrant inflows.
Since the prefecture-level trade barriers are constructed using prefecture-specific trade
baskets prior to the WTO accession, the estimating equation (1) allows us to answer the
following question: how would migrant inflows to each prefecture change if export patterns
of each prefecture remained constant and there was a reduction in trade policy uncertainty?





inflow of employed immigrants into pref. j between (t− 5) and t
stock of employed population of pref. j observed at t
which can be interpreted as the probability that a randomly chosen individual in the total observed employed
population of prefecture j at year t is a recent migrant, i.e., somebody who migrated in the last five years,
which is a common measure of recent migration flows used in the literature (see for example Card 2001).
33Note that interacting the time-invariant change in time-varying variables, with the Postt dummy, is
equivalent to including the time-varying variables directly (see Pierce and Schott 2016).
34In an additional robustness check we have also clustered the standard errors at the provincial level (see
column 2, Table 6, Panel B) and once again the results continue to hold. As we have only 31 clusters in
this specification, following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), in our baseline results we use the
prefecture level clusters.
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In other words, the specification isolates the impact of the reduction in trade barriers,
independent of changes in export baskets which might have occurred. The key identifying
assumption is that, conditional on the common time trend and prefecture fixed effects, pre-
WTO local export baskets did not change in anticipation of the trade liberalization to come
– which we think is reasonable, given the high level of uncertainty.35
As explained in Section 4, NTR gaps are measured as the difference between Smoot-
Hawley tariff rates and U.S. MFN tariff rates. As a consequence, since NTR gaps are a
function of U.S. trade policy, in particular both past and present U.S. policy, they are not
likely to be endogenous. In particular, it is reasonable to assume that current Chinese
political-economy drivers could not have affected Smoot-Hawley tariff rates, which were set
by the U.S. Congress in the 1930’s. In addition, U.S. MFN tariff rates are the result of
U.S. multilateral negotiations with all WTO countries, therefore they are unlikely to have
been impacted by local conditions in China – especially given that China was not part
of the WTO at the time the MFN rates were set by the U.S. (the end of the Uruguay
Round). The same type of argument makes us confident that changes in tariffs abroad
are not endogenous. Finally, stronger but plausible assumptions are required to justify the
exogeneity of changes in Chinese import tariffs. In this case, one important concern is
that unobserved time-varying shocks might at the same time affect migrant inflows and be
correlated with changes in Chinese import tariffs over time. Note however that the latter
are set at the national level while migrant inflows are measured at the local level, making
this concern less severe.36
5.2 The impact on internal migration
We turn next to examine the impact of trade liberalization on internal male migration flows.
Our results are presented in Table 3.37
Table 3 shows the baseline difference-in-difference (DID) results using, as dependent
variable, the share of (male employed) migrants out of the local (male employed) population.
35The time line of China’s entry into the WTO shows that there was a very significant amount of uncer-
tainty up to the end of negotiations, suggesting that anticipation effects are unlikely to have played a key
role.
36Note that Chinese import tariffs are not the main focus of our analysis, as they are simply a control
variable. Also, they are not always included in the specification – in which case the results on our main
variable are unaffected.
37Note that the majority of our analysis focuses on male migrant workers, and we explore gender hetero-
geneity in Table 9.
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We focus on employed migrants and local population because we want to isolate the labor-
demand channel. Columns (1)–(3) consider all migrants (both “non-hukou” and “hukou”
migrants, and both across and within provinces), whereas columns (4)–(7) consider specific
subgroups. Regression (1) only includes the impact of uncertainty reduction while regression
(2) adds the reduction in tariff rates abroad and in China. Finally, regression (3) presents the
full specification where reductions of investment barriers, the elimination of the MFA quota,
production subsidies and export licenses are also accounted for. All specifications include
prefecture and time fixed effects, and standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
prefecture level. All estimates suggest that a larger reduction in uncertainty is associated
with an increase in the share of in-migrants in the population (relative to the common time
trend). Focusing on our benchmark specification in column (3), everything else equal, a ten
percentage points reduction in tariff uncertainty with the U.S., as measured by the NTR
gap, is associated with a 0.59 percentage point increase in the total migration rate. With
the prefecture-level NTR gap averaging at 32%, prefectures facing the average decline in
trade policy uncertainty experience a 1.89 percentage point increase in the migration rate,
which represents a 24 percent increase. These effects are not driven by changes in the
denominator of the migration rate, as we show later in the paper in Panel B – Column (1),
Table 11.
It is worth noting that, in column (3) which is our preferred specification, also the
tariff variables have the expected signs, although they are insignificant (probably because
of little variation in those variables in this period).38 Reductions in the NTR rate and in
tariffs abroad have a positive (insignificant) impact on migration rates. That is, the larger
the reduction in NTR rates and tariff rates faced by exporters of a Chinese prefecture
abroad, the higher the increase in migrant shares to this prefecture. This is consistent
with the fact that international prices of exported goods are likely to increase when NTR
rates and tariff rates abroad decrease (terms-of-trade effect of tariff reductions); moreover,
prefectures demand more migrant labor as international prices of exported goods increase,
since production also increases. Moreover, the negative (insignificant) sign on import tariffs
suggests that, the larger the reductions in a prefecture’s import tariff rates, the smaller
38On the other hand, Zi (2016) finds that a reduction in import tariffs is correlated with an increase in
internal migration, which is what we find if we don’t account for the reduction in trade policy uncertainty
(see Table C2 in the Supplementary Appendix). Note though that once we account for the decline in trade
policy uncertainty the coefficient on the tariff change is no longer statistically significant.
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the increase in in-migrant shares to that prefecture. This suggests that prefectures might
replace migrant labor with cheaper imported inputs.
In columns (4)-(7) of Table 3 we study whether the reduction in trade policy uncertainty
had a differential effect, depending on the type of migrants considered. This type of analysis
will shed light on whether the changes in internal migration we observe were driven in part
by internal migration policy changes, and if so, of which type. If we found significant
effects when we only consider hukou migrants, then we could conclude that the reduction in
uncertainty triggered major hukou policy changes, of the type involving access of migrants
to the welfare state of the prefecture of destination (through the acquisition of the hukou
of the new residence). The reason is that this aspect of hukou policy was definitely binding
before the period of our analysis, i.e. any change in the number of hukou migrants could
only take place if policy was relaxed. If on the other hand we found that our results are
completely driven by non-hukou migrants, then we would not be able to separately identify
changes in policy. The reason is that non-hukou migration had already been partially
liberalized before our period of analysis, and so the results could be consistent with either
a policy-unconstrained world or with policy changes.39
In column (4) we start by restricting our attention to non-hukou migrants, consider-
ing both relocations across prefectures within the same province and across provinces. In
columns (5)-(7) we restrict our attention to migration across provinces – as data for hukou
migration are only available at this level. As a benchmark, column (5) presents the es-
timated impact of uncertainty reduction on total cross-province migrants (non-hukou plus
hukou migrants); column (6) focuses instead on non-hukou cross-province migrants, and col-
umn (7) on hukou cross-province migrants. Our results for non-hukou migration (column
4), total cross-province migration (column (5)) and for non-hukou cross-province migration
are broadly comparable to the findings in column (3). At the same time, we do not find
evidence of a significant impact of the reduction in trade policy uncertainty on “hukou”
migration (column (7)). These results suggest that there was no liberalization of migra-
tion policy of the type involving full access of migrants to the public goods and services
associated with the acquisition of the local hukou status. At the same time, as mentioned
39In other words, an increase in the share of non-hukou migrants could be driven by a greater number of
individuals who want to move to a prefecture – if the prefecture already allows inflows of non-hukou migrants
– or by the liberalization of policy vis a vis non-hukou migrants – if the prefecture initially has a binding
quota.
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above, the significant results in the regressions for non-hukou migrants do not allow us to
identify an independent role played by changes in policy for non-hukou migrants. Those
results could be driven by pure economic factors in prefectures where non-hukou migrants
were already allowed to move in.
There are two caveats in the last set of results. First, data limitations imply that hukou
migrants can only be observed across provinces and not within provinces. It might be
that some major hukou policy changes did in fact take place as a consequence of China’s
WTO accession – of the type involving acquisition of the local hukou in the prefecture
of destination – but only within each province. Second, it is possible that, among hukou
migrants, we include return migrants who go back to the prefecture where they were born,
and for which they enjoy local hukou, after having lived and worked in another location.
Since the latter type of move is not driven by economic factors but most likely by life-cycle
considerations (for example the desire to live close to family during retirement), it may bias
the estimates in the hukou regressions towards zero and in part explain why we do not find
significant results in these models. To investigate this issue, we carry out robustness checks
where we break down the sample by age groups and we find no evidence of return migration
of old hukou migrants (the results are available upon request).
Our basic identification strategy relies on a difference in difference methodology. For
our estimates to be plausible, we need to rule out the presence of any difference in time
trends in the pre-treatment period between the treatment and control groups (note that, by
treatment and control groups, we mean prefectures which were, respectively, highly treated
and lightly treated, since our treatment variable is not dichotomous but continuous). To
this end, we re-estimate the difference-in-differences model over the pre-treatment period.
For the pre-treatment parallel trend assumption to be satisfied, we should find that the
difference-in-difference estimate for the earlier period is statistically insignificant and close
to zero.
The analysis of the trends in the pre-treatment period is based on using migrant in-
flows that took place between 1990 and 2000 and determines whether they were affected
differentially for prefectures in the treatment vs. control groups. The results are reported
in Table 4. Since it is the 2000-2005 values of the NTR gap that determine whether a pre-
fecture is treated or not, the treatment and control groups are defined according to these
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values. We measure tariffs that appear as explanatory variables in two different ways.40 In
one set of regressions (see panel A, Table 4), we measure them in 2000-2005, which implies
that the treatment and control groups are defined exactly as in our main specification. At
the same time, we realize that changes in tariffs during the 90’s might be an omitted vari-
able affecting the pattern of change in migration rates in the 90’s. Therefore, in another set
of regressions (see panel B, Table 4), we measure the tariffs which appear as explanatory
variables using data for the 90’s. Note that both these exercises are variants of the “pre-
treatment parallel trends exercise”. Importantly they both show that our treatment and
control groups follow parallel trends before China’s WTO accession. In Table 5 we carry
out a related exercise, which we label the “falsification exercise”. In this case we consider
a period – the 90’s – during which there was no reduction in trade policy uncertainty faced
abroad by Chinese exporters. Yet we can construct pseudo-treatment and pseudo-control
groups, based on data on the NTR gap for that period. In particular, in the falsification
exercise we measure the NTR gap as the difference between the non-NTR U.S. tariff rates
and the 90’s NTR tariff rates. Moreover, we measure tariffs which appear as explanatory
variables using data for the 90’s. Since there was no treatment in the 90’s, we expect to
estimate zero effects, which is exactly what we find.
6 Additional Results
In this section, we provide several additional results that show: 1) the robustness of our
main findings; 2) the main channel through which the reduction in trade policy uncertainty
affects internal migration, i.e. changes in exports to the U.S.; and 3) how the findings vary
across different migrant groups.
6.1 Robustness
In our benchmark estimates we used a measure of the weighted NTR gap, where the weights
were calculated using the prefecture’s basket of exports to the United States in 1997-1999.
There are two types of concerns with this measure. First, using exports as weights un-
derstates the policy uncertainty prefectures face since, as we will show, exports tend to
be lower when uncertainty is higher and to increase when this uncertainty is reduced (see
40Note that the other control variables are available only for the main sample period (2000 and 2005).
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Table 7). In other words, products exposed to high trade policy uncertainty are given
a smaller weight. Second, although we think it is highly unlikely that firms could have
predicted the exact timing and magnitude of changes to come, exactly because of all the
uncertainty surrounding China’s entry in the WTO,41 we worry that export baskets to the
United States in 1997-1999 might be affected by firms adjusting beforehand how much they
export. We address these concerns in several ways. First, we start by using an unweighted
measure of the NTR gap based only on whether a given product was exported to the United
States (see column (1), Panel A, Table 6). Second, we construct an alternative weighted
NTR gap using the basket of exports to the entire world, rather than only to the United
States (see column (2)). Third, we use an unweighted measure based only on whether a
given product was exported to the entire world (see column (3)). Finally, we replace our
export-based weights with sectoral employment shares in 1990 (see column (4)). The sign
and significance of our results are unaffected, indicating that the possible endogeneity of
export shares to the United States is not a major concern.
While it is important to assess the robustness of our results to the use of alternative
weighting schemes, it is worth noting that the 1990 employment weights correspond to local
production which is directed to both the domestic and international markets. As the recent
literature on international trade in the presence of heterogeneous firms shows, we cannot
assume though that domestic and international sales are perfectly correlated, since only the
most productive firms will serve both markets.42 Hence our preferred specification is the one
based on the weighted NTR gap using as weights export shares (to the U.S.) which allow
us to capture precisely the exposure to trade policy uncertainty in U.S. markets. While
endogeneity of the export weights might be a concern, note that the time line of China’s
entry into the WTO shows that there was great uncertainty up to the end of negotiations,
suggesting that anticipation effects are unlikely to have played a key role.43
A second concern that needs to be addressed is the potential omitted variable bias that
can arise if tariff uncertainty with the U.S. is correlated with local economic growth and the
latter also contributes to increased local labor demand. For example, coastal prefectures
have enjoyed faster economic growth and absorbed more migrant labor during our sample
41For details, see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/acc e/a1 chine e.htm.
42This might explain the large size of the effect based on employment weights – as they might capture the
impact through the domestic market as well as the “pure” trade effect.
43If the estimates based on employment weights are still thought to be valid, then our baseline results are
– if anything – biased towards zero compared to those.
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period. To address this potential concern, in Table 6, Panel B, column (1), we control for
the GDP per capita of each prefecture in 2000 and 2005. The estimated effect of the NTR
gap on the total migration rate is unaffected compared to our benchmark result (Table 3,
column (3)). In addition, we also account for the fact that prefectures with larger NTR gaps
are likely to export a smaller volume of trade (as a share of GDP) at the beginning of the
period. Therefore these prefectures will likely experience a smaller reduction in trade policy
uncertainty and a smaller increase in migration rate. If this is the case, our estimates would
be biased towards zero, which is consistent with what we find in Table 6, Panel B, column
(2): When we control for the volume of trade (as a share of GDP) of each prefecture in
2000 and 2005, the estimated impact of Postt ·NTR Gapj is larger in absolute value (even
though the difference is not statistically significant).
Finally, unobservables or latent drivers might be shared by prefectures that are geograph-
ically close to each other and/or lie within the same province. If spatial spillovers exist – in
other words, if “close” prefectures influence each other – then we can no longer assume the
independence of observations and the OLS estimates will be biased (Anselin 2013, LeSage
and Pace 2009). We address this concern following three alternative approaches. First, to
account for potential correlation between the error terms across prefectures within the same
province, we cluster the standard errors at the province level in column (3) and the results
are once again qualitatively unaffected.44 Second, in column (4) we implement a spatial
error model (SEM) and allow the error terms to be spatially autocorrelated. In particular,
we assume ε = λWε+u, where ε is the error term, and W is an NxN spatial weights matrix
specifying whether a pair of prefectures affect each other based on geographic proximity.
Finally, in column (5) we implement a spatial Durbin error model (SDEM), which includes
spatial lags in both the explanatory variables and the errors. The results in columns (4)-(5)
show that our estimates are robust when we account for unobserved spatial spillovers.45
44We have estimated all the specifications in the paper with errors clustered at the provincial level and
our findings are overall robust (results available upon request).
45Note that the coefficients in columns (4) and (5) are smaller than the benchmark estimates because
they capture only the “direct effect” – the impact of a prefecture’s tariff uncertainty reduction on its own
migration rate. Meanwhile, the spatial regressions allow for an “indirect effect” whereby a prefecture’s
migration rate could be affected by neighboring prefectures’ tariff uncertainty, where the latter is likely
relevant because of input/output linkages at the regional level. Accounting for both the direct and indirect
effects, the total effect of tariff uncertainty reduction is 0.11 (SE = 0.049).
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6.2 Channel: the impact on exports to the U.S.
The focus of this paper is on the impact – on internal migration within China – of the
reduction in trade policy uncertainty faced by Chinese exporters in U.S. markets. The
main channel through which this effect is likely to operate is exports from China to the
United States. The intuition is that, as a consequence of the elimination of the threat of
MFN non-renewal by the U.S. government, both Chinese firms and U.S. and multinational
firms producing in China should be more willing to invest in large projects in China to
produce and export to the U.S.. If Chinese exports indeed increase, this is likely to impact
the demand for labor at the local level, which in turn will affect internal labor mobility.
Using data on the stock of fixed assets at the city level, Cheng and Potlogea (2015)
provide evidence that a reduction in trade policy uncertainty is associated with an increase
both in the local stock of fixed capital and in foreign direct investment. To directly investi-
gate the role of trade flows, we estimate instead a specification which is very similar to the
one presented in Equation (1), the main difference being that we focus on Chinese exports
to the U.S. market as the dependent variable (see Table 7).
We consider variation both across 6-digit HS product codes (columns (1)-(2)) and across
both products and prefectures (columns (3)-(4)). Moreover, we group annual exports for
1997-2000 and 2002-2006 to define respectively the pre– and post–treatment periods. In
columns (1) and (3) we focus only on exports to the U.S. whereas in column (2) and (4),
to address the possibility that exports might transit through Hong Kong (Fisman and Wei
(2004)), we consider both Chinese exports to the U.S. and to Hong Kong.46 The results in
columns (1) and (2) show that higher policy uncertainty reduction for a certain product is
associated with an increase in exports to the US. In columns (3)-(4) we find the same result
at the prefecture by product level. Based on the specification with product-level exports
in column (1), everything else equal, a ten percentage points reduction in tariff uncertainty
with the U.S., as measured by the NTR gap, is associated with a 19 percent increase in the
exports of that product to the U.S. Similarly, based on the specification at the prefecture
by product level in column (3), everything else equal, a ten percentage points reduction
in tariff uncertainty with the U.S. is associated with a 20 percent increase in the exports
to the U.S.. Therefore prefectures facing the average decline in trade policy uncertainty –
46Note that the NTR gap in columns (1)-(2) varies at the product level while in columns (3)-(4) it varies
at the product by prefecture level.
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which is around 31 percentage points – experienced a 62% increase in exports.
6.3 Heterogeneous Effects
We turn now to carry out a series of exercises to investigate whether the migration response
to trade policy uncertainty reduction is heterogeneous across prefectures and demographic
groups. In Table 8 we allow for non-linear effects of the reduction in trade policy uncertainty.
In particular we assign prefectures to 5 quintiles based on the size of their trade policy
uncertainty reduction and estimate a different impact of the NTR gap after China’s WTO
accession for each quintile. We find that the positive effect of the NTR gap is driven by
prefectures in the fourth and fifth quintiles. Hence our results are robust to accounting for
non-linear effects.
Next we explore whether our results differ by gender, age and hukou status at origin –
see Table 9 where we run the same specification as in column (3) of Table 3 for separate
subgroups. In panel A we focus on gender; for comparison purposes, in column (1) we
replicate the results for males from our baseline model (column (3) in Table 3), whereas
in columns (2) and (3) we consider respectively females and total (males plus females).
While the impact of the reduction in trade policy point uncertainty is significant for both
groups, the point estimates are larger for males than for females, even if the two are not
statistically different. In panel B we explore the role of age by considering four separate
subgroups: 16-25 years old, 26-40 years old, 41-55 years-old, 56-65 years old. Consistent
with our expectations, we find that the strongest and more significant results hold in the
sample of the 16-25 and 26-40 year old migrant workers. For the older age groups, none of
the effects are instead significant. Finally, in panel C we focus only on non-hukou migrants
and study the role of hukou status at origin. Column (3) reports as a benchmark the findings
of column (4) Table (3). Interestingly our results indicate that the reduction in trade policy
uncertainty had a larger effect on the mobility of urban rather than rural residents.47 One
possible explanation for these findings is that land rights are highly uncertain in rural China,
and permanently leaving a rural village might result in the confiscation and redistribution
of the land initially assigned to a household. This adds to the migration costs faced by rural
households and indeed, as shown by Mullan, Grosjean, and Kontoleon (2011) land tenure
insecurity reduces rural-urban migration. In a related study, de la Rupelle, Quheng, Shi,
47Note that in both Panels B and C we focus on the male sample.
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and Vendryes (2009) find also that rural migrants keep going back and forth between origin
villages and urban destinations in order to protect the rights to their land. As a result,
migration from rural areas tends to be more temporary and circular than migration from
urban areas – which implies that rural–urban migration might not be fully accounted for
in official statistics.
Third, we explore heterogeneous effects based on skill. As explained in section 4, for the
purpose of our analysis a skilled worker is an individual who has completed at least a high
school degree, whereas someone with less than a high school education is unskilled. The
results are reported in Table 10 where we separately estimate the impact of a reduction in
trade policy uncertainty on the migration rates of unskilled and skilled workers, respectively.
In columns (1)-(2) we use the same measure of uncertainty reduction for both skill groups
(NTR gap) while in columns (3)-(4) we construct a skill-specific measure of the NTR gap (by
dividing products in each prefecture’s trade basket into two groups, skilled-labor-intensive
products and an unskilled-labor-intensive products).48 Our results indicate that a reduction
in trade policy uncertainty has a strong and significant positive impact on skilled migration
rates, but no effect on unskilled migration rates. We can think of three possible explanations
for this finding. First, the reduction in trade policy uncertainty increased the demand for
skilled labor but not for unskilled labor. Second, given the same increase in labor demand
for the two skill groups, skilled labor is more mobile. Third, given the same increase in
labor demand for the two skill groups, the higher demand for unskilled labor was satisfied
through an increase in supply by native workers in the prefecture. We further explore the
role played by these mechanisms in Section 7.
7 The impact on other labor market outcomes
To better understand how Chinese local labor markets adjust to the trade shock, we carry
out a series of additional exercises, which are reported in Tables 11 and 12. Our point of
departure is that, in addition to hiring migrants, local labor markets can accommodate an
increase in demand in other ways, such as by employing more local workers, or by extending
the number of working hours of the employed workers.49
48Skilled-labor-intensive products are those that use skilled workers (i.e. those who have at least completed
high school) more intensively. For more details on the definition of skill intensity, see Appendix B.2.
49Note that our Census data do not provide information on the other potential margin of labor market
adjustment, namely wages.
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We start by exploring the impact of the trade shocks on the employment of both natives
and migrants (see Table 11). In panel A we focus on the effect on employment rates50,
whereas in panel B we investigate the impact on employment levels. In columns (1)-(3),
panel A, we consider the effect on all workers, without distinguishing by skill level. In column
(1) the dependent variable is the total employment rate of both natives and migrants,
whereas in column (2) and (3) we focus, respectively, on migrants and natives. We find
that the decline in trade policy uncertainty did not have any effect on employment rates,
both in the aggregate and for each subgroup of the population. In columns (4)–(6) we
repeat the same exercise focusing on unskilled workers, i.e. workers who did not complete
a high–school degree, whereas in columns (7)–(9) we consider skilled workers. Also in these
cases we do not estimate a significant effect of the reduction in trade policy uncertainty. One
possible explanation for these results is that, with average employment rates at around 97%,
the Chinese labor market was quite saturated during this period, thus there was little room
to adjust to the increased demand for labor through changes in the rates of employment.
Even though employment rates did not adjust, the analysis in panel B indicates that as a
result of the shock the employment level of migrants did increase, and this is true for both
skilled and unskilled individuals.
What happened at the intensive margin? In other words, did the number of hours worked
by different groups of individuals adjust as a result of the shock? To explore this question,
in Table 12 we turn to consider the impact of the reduction in trade policy uncertainty on
the number of weekly working hours, following the same structure as in Table 11. Several
interesting results emerge. First, as can be seen in column (1), the reduction in trade
policy uncertainty increased the overall number of hours worked in more intensively treated
prefectures. Interestingly though, this result is driven by natives spending more time at
work, whereas hours of work by migrants did not change. Looking at different effects by
skill group, the findings in columns (4)–(6) indicate that the adjustment in hours of work
affected unskilled workers, rather than skilled ones, and once again the effect applied only
to natives and not to migrant workers.
From Table 10, Table 11 and Table 12, we can see that a reduction in trade policy
50The employment rate of natives (migrants) equals the number of employed native (migrant) workers
divided by the total number of natives (migrants) in the labor force. An individual is defined as employed if
1) they have worked more than one hour for pay in the reference week, or 2) they have not worked for pay
in the reference week due to business off-seasons, training, or vacation.
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uncertainty led to an increase in demand for both skilled and unskilled labor. While the
adjustment to increased demand for unskilled labor took place through longer working
hours of unskilled native workers, the adjustment to increased demand for skilled labor was
accommodated by admitting and employing more skilled migrant workers.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we carried out a systematic analysis of the effects of China’s entry in the
WTO on the internal mobility of Chinese workers. Building on the recent work by Pierce
and Schott (2016) and Handley and Limao (2017), we focused on the role played by the
reduction in trade policy uncertainty in U.S. markets due to permanent MFN status granted
by the U.S. to China. Our analysis delivered several interesting results. First, we have shown
that Chinese prefectures facing a larger decline in trade policy uncertainty experienced larger
inflows of migrant workers. When we looked at different types of migrants – hukou vs. non-
hukou migrants – we found that it is the latter who drove the changes in internal migration
rates. In other words, we found that the labor flows triggered by the reduction in trade
policy uncertainty have been characterized by a limited access of migrants to local public
goods and services. Second, we have investigated one natural mechanism that could explain
this finding, namely changes in labor demand brought about by changes in trade flows. Our
results show that this mechanism was in fact at work: products and prefectures facing a
larger decline in trade policy uncertainty vis a vis the United States experienced a larger
increase in exports towards that country. Third, we have explored how the decline in trade
policy uncertainty affected different subgroups of the population. Our results indicate that
the effect of the trade shock was driven by skilled rather than unskilled migrant workers
and by prime working age migrant workers. Interestingly, while the bulk of the results
are for the sample of male migrant workers, we also find significant results for the sample
of female migrant workers. Finally, we have explored the role played by other potential
labor market adjustment mechanisms. Our results indicate that the main adjustment –
in prefectures facing a larger decline in trade policy uncertainty – in the case of unskilled
labor has involved an increase in the number of hours worked by local (“native”) unskilled
workers. We found instead no effect on the employment rate of neither migrants nor native
workers (neither skilled nor unskilled).
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One of the main contributions of our paper is to have considered the institutional details
of the internal migration framework within China, by distinguishing hukou vs. non-hukou
migration. Our results show no evidence that the trade shock we have examined in our
paper led to a liberalization of the hukou system associated with changes in the registration
location and access to local public services. This might explain why we find significant
results only for skilled migrants, since the latter are better able to overcome the lack of access
to public services. Hence, we can derive important policy implications from our analysis.
Our results suggest that one way China has been able to reap the benefits of trade openness,
and further its economic development, has been through increased skilled migration. To
achieve an even more efficient geographic allocation of workers – and facilitate unskilled
migration – in response to the growing opportunities brought up by trade, a liberalization
of the hukou system of the type mentioned above should be further pursued.
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Figure 1: Heat maps of in-migration rates among employed population aged 16-65, in 2000
and 2005
(a) Prefecture level “non-hukou” plus “hukou” migration rates in 2000 (%)
(b) Prefecture level “non-hukou” plus “hukou” migration rates in 2005 (%)
Notes: Figures (a) and (b) plot each prefecture’s share of cross-prefecture migrants among working age (16
– 65 years old) employed male workers, in 2000 and 2005, respectively. The unit of observation is prefecture,
and province borders are outlined in thick lines. Prefectures are color-coded into 8 intervals based on their
in-migrant shares.
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Figure 2: Heat maps of migration and trade policy uncertainty
(a) Increase from 2000 to 2005 in in-migration rates
(b) Weighted NTR gaps, 1999
Notes: Figure (a) plots the increase in cross-prefecture in-migrant shares from 2000 to 2005, in percentage
points. The sample is working age (16 – 65 years old) employed male workers. The unit of observation is
a prefecture, and province borders are outlined in thick lines. Prefectures are color-coded into 8 (roughly)
equal-sized intervals based on their in-migrant shares. Figure (b) plots the size of Normal-Trade-Relations
(NTR) gaps for each prefecture in 1999 – before China was granted permanent normal trade relations status.
See text for details of the construction of NTR gaps.
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Product level NTR gaps, 1999
Notes: This figure shows the scatterplot and histogram of NTR gaps at the HS 6-digit (1996) product level.
See text for details on the construction of NTR gaps.
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Table 1: National-level internal migration of employed population
1990 Male Female Total
Total number of migrants (million) 10.04 7.71 17.75
Number of skilled migrants (million) 3.07 1.50 4.57
Number of unskilled migrants (million) 6.97 6.21 13.18
Rate of total migration (%) 2.78 2.61 2.70
Rate of skilled migration (%) 5.44 4.65 5.04
Rate of unskilled migration (%) 2.29 2.36 2.33
2000 Male Female Total
Total number of migrants (million) 29.38 22.35 51.73
Number of skilled migrants (million) 6.82 3.91 10.73
Number of unskilled migrants (million) 22.56 18.44 41.00
Rate of total migration (%) 8.13 7.41 7.77
Rate of skilled migration (%) 9.52 8.70 9.11
Rate of unskilled migration (%) 7.78 7.18 7.48
2005 Male Female Total
Total number of migrants (million) 37.36 29.36 66.72
Number of skilled migrants (million) 11.31 7.47 18.78
Number of unskilled migrants (million) 26.05 21.89 47.94
Rate of total migration (%) 10.27 9.45 9.86
Rate of skilled migration (%) 14.33 14.65 14.49
Rate of unskilled migration (%) 9.15 8.43 8.79
Notes: This table describes the national-level stocks and rates of recent internal migrants (arrived in the
previous five years) in 1990, 2000, and 2005. Samples are drawn from the Censuses. We focus on 16-65
employed workers. Total migration includes cross-prefecture non-hukou and cross-province hukou migrants.
Skilled workers are those who have completed at least high school education.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of prefecture level panel data
2000 2005
Total migration rate 8.14 10.37
(13.21) (15.80)
Total non-hukou migration rate 7.77 9.91
(13.13) (15.83)
Total provincial migration rate (Prov NHM + HM) 4.94 6.41
(10.34) (12.70)
Provincial non-hukou migration rate (Prov NHM) 4.57 5.95
(10.26) (12.72)
Provincial hukou migration rate (Prov HM) 0.46 0.55
(0.66) (0.70)
NTR gap (weighted) 31.96 31.96
(13.13) (13.13)
NTR rate 3.87 3.68
(2.48) (2.44)
Tariff abroad 4.51 4.11
(3.53) (3.28)
Import tariff 13.70 7.25
(6.45) (2.84)
Contract intensity 43.24 43.24
(7.78) (7.78)
MFA quota bound 12.75 12.75
(12.59) (12.59)
Production subsidy 0.86 0.54
(2.09) (1.75)
Export license 0.34 0.49
(0.23) (0.25)
N 322 322
Notes: This table summarizes migration measures and trade barriers at the prefecture level. The sample
includes 322 prefectures with consistent boundaries from 1990 to 2005. The first five rows list migration
rates calculated as the shares of migrants in a prefecture’s working-age employed population. Rows 6-13
list measures of trade barriers and other policies considered in the main regression specification. NTR
gap (weighted) measures the reduction in uncertainty of U.S. tariff rates. NTR Rate measures the weighted
average MFN tariffs in the U.S. market. Tariff Abroad is the weighted average tariff rate a prefecture faced in
China’s top export markets, including Hong Kong, Japan, European Union, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan,
Australia, Canada, and Russia. Import tariff is the weighted average import tariff a prefecture imposes on
imported goods, given its import basket. Contract Intensity measures the share of intermediate inputs that
require relationship-specific investments. MFA Quota Bound measures the share of textile exports that
would have faced binding MFA quotas were not for China’s WTO-accession. Production subsidy measures
the share of local production which is subsidized. Export license measures the share of workers employed
by firms with export licenses. All measures of trade barriers are aggregated from the product/industry/firm
level to prefecture level. See text for more details.
39
Table 3: Migration Rates (different migrant definitions)
Migration rate All migrants (hukou PLUS non-hukou) NHM Prov NHM+HM Prov NHM Prov HM
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Post x NTR gap 0.063 0.063 0.059 0.055 0.041 0.037 0.004
(0.025)** (0.026)** (0.028)** (0.027)** (0.022)* (0.021)* (0.005)
Post x ∆ NTR Rate -0.013 0.088 0.061 0.207 0.179 0.030
(0.658) (0.632) (0.593) (0.442) (0.393) (0.132)
Post x ∆ Tariff Abroad -0.006 0.007 0.016 -0.032 -0.023 -0.010
(0.086) (0.078) (0.075) (0.070) (0.057) (0.036)
Post x ∆ Import Tariff 0.007 -0.000 0.011 -0.011 -0.000 -0.012
(0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.036) (0.033) (0.010)
Post x Contract Intensity 0.036 0.041 0.030 0.036 -0.006
(0.040) (0.039) (0.029) (0.028) (0.008)
Post x MFA Quota Bound -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.006)
Post x ∆ Production Subsidy 0.060 0.051 0.088 0.079 0.013
(0.225) (0.223) (0.187) (0.183) (0.024)
Post x ∆ Export License -0.011 -0.011 -0.003 -0.004 0.000
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002)
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.34
N 644 644 644 644 644 644 644
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered at the prefecture level. The dependent variables are:
the migration rate of hukou (cross-province) migrants PLUS non-hukou (cross-province and cross-prefecture)
migrants (columns (1)-(3)); migration rate of all (cross-province and cross-prefecture) non-hukou migrants
(NHM in column (4)); migration rate of cross-province hukou PLUS non-hukou migrants (Prov NHM + HM
in column (5)); cross-province non-hukou migrants (Prov NHM in column (6)); and cross-province hukou
migrants (Prov HM in column (7)). The “pre-treatment” period is 2000 and the “post-treatment” is 2005.
The sample includes 322 prefectures with consistent boundaries from 1990 to 2005. The DID terms are
constructed using a time dummy “Post” interacted with changes in trade/production policies. Refer to
Table 2 and text for the definition and construction of the explanatory variables.
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Table 4: Pre-treatment trends: migration rates of all migrants; 2000-2005 NTR gaps
Panel A: 2000 and 2005 tariffs as controls
Dependent variable: 2000-2005 1990 - 2000
Migration rate NHM+HM NHM+HM NHM Prov NHM+HM Prov NHM Prov HM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post x NTR gap 0.059 0.034 0.035 0.027 0.028 -0.001
(0.028)** (0.034) (0.035) (0.027) (0.028) (0.007)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.65 0.63 0.42 0.39 0.10
N 644 644 644 644 644 644
Panel B: 1990 and 2000 tariffs as controls
Dependent variable: 2000-2005 1990 - 2000
Migration rate NHM+HM NHM+HM NHM Prov NHM+HM Prov NHM Prov HM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post x NTR gap 0.059 0.050 0.054 0.012 0.016 -0.003
(0.028)** (0.042) (0.042) (0.030) (0.030) (0.009)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.65 0.63 0.42 0.39 0.09
N 644 644 644 644 644 644
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: This table shows the pre-treatment trend using internal migration measures between 1990 and 2000 to
test whether internal migration changed in anticipation to elimination of trade policy uncertainty after 2001.
The sample includes 322 prefectures, observed at 1990 and 2000. As a comparison, we reproduce column (3)
in Table 3 for the same 322-prefecture delineation in 2000-2005 in the first column. Columns (2) - (6) report
pre-trend of 1990 to 2000 migration. Both panels use the reduction in trade policy uncertainty between
2000 and 2005 – the 1999 NTR gaps used in the main specification (Table 3) – as the main explanatory
variable. Panel A uses tariff rates from 2000 and 2005 as controls, and Panel B uses tariff rates from 1990
and 2000 as controls. Both panels include other control variables including contract intensity, MFA quota
bound, production subsidy, and export licensing. Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered at the
prefecture level. See text for more details.
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Table 5: Falsification test: migration rates of all migrants; 1990-2000 NTR gaps
Dependent variable: 2000-2005 1990 - 2000
Migration rate NHM+HM NHM+HM NHM Prov NHM+HM Prov NHM Prov HM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post x NTR gap 0.059 0.019 0.026 -0.021 -0.014 -0.008
(0.028)** (0.043) (0.042) (0.033) (0.032) (0.008)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.65 0.63 0.42 0.39 0.09
N 644 644 644 644 644 644
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: This table shows the falsification test using internal migration rates between 1990 and 2000 and test
whether they respond to the contemporary U.S. trade policy uncertainty – the 1990 NTR gap – which was
yet to be eliminated. The sample includes 322 prefectures, observed at 1990 and 2000. As a comparison, we
reproduce column (3) in Table 3 for the same 322-prefecture delineation in 2000-2005 in the first column.
Columns (2) - (6) report the results of falsification tests on 1990 to 2000 migration, with the 1990 NTR gaps
as the main explanatory variable and tariff rates from 1990 and 2000 as controls. Control variables include
NTR rate, tariff abroad, import tariff, contract intensity, MFA quota bound, production subsidy, and export
licensing. Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered at the prefecture level. See text for more details.
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Table 6: Robustness Check: migration rate of all migrants (hukou PLUS non-hukou), using
alternative NTR gaps
Panel A: Alternative measures of NTR gaps
Trade US Trade World Trade World Employment
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x NTR gap 0.081 0.062 0.102 0.178
(0.041)* (0.031)** (0.051)** (0.077)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for p.c. GDP No No No No
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Cluster Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
N 644 644 644 644
Panel B: Different specifications
Control for Control for SE clustered at Spatial Error Spatial Durbin
per capita GDP Post*Exp province level Model Error Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post x NTR gap 0.063 0.063 0.059 0.035 0.039
(0.029)** (0.028)** (0.030)* (0.018)* (0.019)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for p.c. GDP Yes No No No No
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Cluster Prefecture Prefecture Province Spatial Error Spatial Error
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.04 0.08
N 628 628 644 636 636
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: This table shows robustness checks of the baseline specification. The dependent variable is the migra-
tion rate of hukou (cross-province) migrants PLUS non-hukou migrants. In Panel A, alternative measures
of NTR gaps are used. In the first column, prefecture-level NTR gaps are simple averages of NTR gaps of
products exported to the US, and the prefecture-level import and export tariff rates are simple averages of
tariff rates of products imported and exported by each prefecture. In the second column, prefecture-level
NTR gaps are weighted averages of NTR gaps of products exported to the world, and the prefecture-level
import and export tariff rates are weighted averages of tariff rates of products imported and exported by
each prefecture. In the third column, prefecture-level NTR gaps are simple averages of NTR gaps of products
exported to the world, and the prefecture-level import and export tariff rates are simple averages of tariff
rates of products imported and exported by each prefecture. Panel B presents 5 alternative specifications:
control for GDP per capita in (1), controlling for share of exports in (2), clustering standard errors at the
province level in (3), including spatially correlated errors in (4) and (5). Note that results columns (4) and
(5) in panel B come from spatial regressions on the first difference specification. The sample size in columns
(1) and (2) is smaller due to missing GDP measures in 8 prefectures, while the sample size in (4) and (5) is
smaller due to concordance issues with the underlying geographic map. Control variables include NTR rate,
tariff abroad, import tariff, contract intensity, MFA quota bound, production subsidy, and export licensing.
Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered at the prefecture level except in B(3). See text for more
details.
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Table 7: Log Exports to US
Dependent variable: by product by product and prefecture
log export US US & HK US US & HK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x NTR gap 0.019 0.023 0.020 0.017
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
(number of FE) (2) (2) (2) (2)
Product fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
(number of FE) (4,835) (4,835) (4,835) (4,835)
Prefecture FE No No Yes Yes
(number of FE) – – (318) (318)
SE Cluster Product Product Prefecture Prefecture
Adjusted R-squared 0.77 0.73 0.34 0.36
N 9,670 9,670 743,554 743,554
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is 6-digit HS product-level average log export values to
the U.S. during 1997-2000 and 2002-2006. In columns (3)-(4), the dependent variable is the prefecture-by-
product-level average annual log export values to the U.S. during 1997-2000 and 2002-2006. Huber-White
SEs are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the product level in columns (1)-(2), and at
the prefecture level in columns (3)-(4). “Controls” include NTR rate, tariff abroad, import tariff, contract
intensity, MFA quota bound, production subsidy, and export license. Note that in all columns, we use the
DID interaction of “Post” and changes in policies as in the main specification.
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Table 8: Heterogeneous effects: migration rate of all migrants (hukou PLUS non-hukou) by
NTR gap quintiles
Dependent variable: Migration rate of NHM+HM
1st Quintile: Post x NTR gap 0.305
(0.190)
2nd Quintile: Post x NTR gap 0.069
(0.071)
3rd Quintile: Post x NTR gap 0.082
(0.051)
4th Quintile: Post x NTR gap 0.073
(0.043)*
5th Quintile: Post x NTR gap 0.065
(0.033)**
Controls Yes




* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: This table presents the non-linear effects of trade policy changes on migration rates. 322 prefectures
are grouped into quintiles of treatment groups. All specifications include prefecture and time fixed effects.
The dependent variable is the migration rate of hukou (cross-province) migrants PLUS non-hukou (cross-
prefecture) migrants. Control variables include NTR rate, tariff abroad, import tariff, contract intensity,
MFA quota bound, production subsidy, and export licensing. Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered
at the prefecture level. See text for more details.
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Table 9: Heterogeneous effects by gender, age and hukou type at origin
Panel A: By gender
Dependent variable: Male Female Total
NHM+HM (1) (2) (3)
Post x NTR gap 0.059 0.044 0.053
(0.028)** (0.021)** (0.024)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.93 0.92
N 644 644 644
Panel B: Males by age group
Dependent variable: 16-25 26-40 41-55 56-65
NHM+HM (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x NTR gap 0.080 0.085 0.035 -0.014
(0.047)* (0.037)** (0.024) (0.042)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.87 0.88 0.83 0.72
N 644 644 644 644
Panel C: Males by type of hukou at origin
Dependent variable: Urban Rural Total
NHM (1) (2) (3)
Post x NTR gap 0.089 0.043 0.055
(0.034)*** (0.036) (0.027)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 0.91 0.91
N 644 644 644
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered at the prefecture level. All specifications include
prefecture and time fixed effects. Sample includes 322 prefectures observed in 2000 and 2005. The dependent
variables are migration rates of hukou (cross-province) migrants PLUS non-hukou (cross-prefecture) migrants
(NHM+HM) by gender in panel A, by age groups in panel B, and migration rates of non-hukou (cross-
prefecture) migrants (NHM) by type of hukou at origin in panel C. We use the NTR gaps and other trade
policy changes in the main specification (Table 3) for all columns, ie, trade policy changes are not specific
to demographic groups. Control variables include NTR rate, tariff abroad, import tariff, contract intensity,
MFA quota bound, production subsidy, and export licensing.46
Table 10: Migration rate of all migrants (hukou PLUS non-hukou); skill-specific
Dependent variable: Same NTR gaps Specific NTR gaps
NHM+HM Unskilled Skilled Unskilled Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x NTR gap 0.042 0.098 0.030 0.067
(0.031) (0.047)** (0.030) (0.032)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.76 0.91 0.77
N 644 644 644 644
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered at the prefecture level. All specifications include
prefecture and time fixed effects. The dependent variable is the migration rate of hukou (cross-province)
migrants and non-hukou (cross-prefecture) migrants by skill types. Skilled workers are those who completed
at least high school education, and skilled sectors are ones that uses skilled workers intensively. The sample
includes unskilled sectors (Columns (1) and (3)) and skilled sectors (Columns (2) and (4)) in 322 prefectures,
observed at 2000 and 2005. In Columns (1)-(2), we use the same NTR gaps for both skill groups, ie, not
skill-specific, while in Columns (3)-(4), we use skill-specific NTR gaps and other trade measures for each
skill group. The other explanatory variables are constructed similarly; they include NTR rate, tariff abroad,
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A Definition of Migrants
To better illustrate the two definitions of migration, graph A.2 and graph A.3 show the
composition of individuals surveyed at a certain prefecture R, which is located in province
P.
Take 2000 as an example, there are three groups of individuals associated with a pre-
fecture: 1) those who are registered and currently residing in R (local residents) 2) those
who are residing but not registered in R (immigrants), and 3) those who are registered
in but away from R (emigrants). Only 1) and 2) are observed in prefecture R, and em-
igrants from R fill out their census questionnaire in their destination prefectures. The
“Unregistered and residing” (immigrants) are what we define as “non-hukou migrants”,
whose location of origin prefectures determine whether they are within–province or cross–
province non-hukou migrants. Among the “Registered and residing” (local residents), we
identify “hukou migrants” as those who, within the previous 5 years, moved to R and ac-
quired residentship. Their origin prefecture determined whether they are within–province
or cross–province hukou migrants. The classification of residents in 2005 are exactly the
same, with one regrettable exception from the data restriction, that is, among the local
residents who are “registered and residing” in a prefecture, we cannot separate natives and
within-province hukou migrants apart. This limitation is the reason why we can only study
cross–province non-hukou migrants in our empirical analysis.
Figure A.1: Administrative organization of a Chinese province
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Figure A.2: Composition of survey subjects in 2000 Census
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Figure A.3: Composition of survey subjects in 2005 Census
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B Data Sources
This section provides information on the data used in this paper, as well as on the key
variables employed in the empirical analysis. There are three main sources of data: China’s
Population Census for 1990, 2000 and 2005; China Custom Data (CCD) covering the period
1997-1999, and tariff rates for 1990 - 2006, obtained from the World Integrated Trade
Solution (WITS) dataset . In addition, the industry skill intensity data has been constructed
using China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (CASIF).
B.1 China Custom Data: 1997-2006
We use China Custom Data (CCD, also called China Import and Export Data) between
1997 – 1999 to construct the the export basket of each prefecture. China Custom Data
is an annual HS-based transaction-level dataset compiled by the General Administration
of Customs of China. It records information on each import/export transaction, and the
variables relevant for our analysis include commodity code (HS 6-digit), partner country,
firm type, firm location at the prefecture level, import/export type, transaction value (in
USD), and transaction types.
B.2 Skill Intensity
We use HS 6-digit level factor intensity data aggregated from the 2004 China’s Annual Sur-
vey of Industrial Firms (CASIF), which is also known as “Chinese Industrial Enterprises
Database”. It is a firm-level dataset, collected yearly by China’s National Bureau of Statis-
tics. The survey includes all industrial firms that are either state-owned, or are non-state
firms with sales above 5 million RMB. It also contains data on the overall composition of
the labor force employed by more than 300,000 industrial enterprises. The data reports
information on industry, output value, export delivery value, number of employers, wage
payments, profit and tax etc. A skilled worker is an individual who has at least completed
high school. Using information on the number of skilled and unskilled workers employed in
the production of each HS-6 digit product, we construct the skill intensity measure as the
share of skilled workers in total employment. Skill intensive products are those characterized
by a value of this indicator above the national median.
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B.3 Census of China: 1990, 2000, 2005
The migration data has been obtained comes form the population Census of China, con-
ducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). We use samples from the 1990, 2000 and
2005 waves. The population Census of China documents detailed information on individ-
ual’s location, hukou status and migration history, among other individual characteristics.
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C Supplementary Results
Table C.1: Migration Rates of all migrants (hukou PLUS non-hukou) in first difference
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Import Tariff 0.112 0.109 0.073
(0.048)** (0.048)** (0.045)
∆ NTR Rate 0.911 0.531
(0.449)** (0.425)




First Difference Yes Yes Yes
SE Robust Robust Robust
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.05
N 340 340 340
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Similar to Zi (2017), this specification is in first differences and the dependent variables measures
the change in migration rates from 2000 to 2005. Note that the point estimates are different because initial
employment level is used as weights. Robust SEs are reported in parentheses.
Table C.2: Comparison of local labor markets
N Median Area (km2) Mean Area (km2) Std. Dev.
U.S. commuting zones 709 9,023 12,625 23,661
Chinese prefectures 344 12,858 27,059 51,407
Chinese counties 2,411 1,941 3,896 9,639
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on the 2000 map of China.
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Table C.3: Migration Rates (different migrant definitions)
All migrants (hukou PLUS non-hukou) NHM Prov NHM+HM Prov NHM Prov HM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Post x NTR gap 0.057 0.052 0.052 0.049 0.037 0.033 0.004
(0.023)** (0.023)** (0.026)** (0.025)* (0.021)* (0.020)* (0.005)
Post x ∆ NTR Rate 0.673 0.694 0.667 0.581 0.554 0.032
(0.712) (0.710) (0.703) (0.492) (0.468) (0.102)
Post x ∆ Tariff Abroad -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.001
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004)
Post x ∆ Import Tariff 0.034 0.032 0.037 0.020 0.026 -0.006
(0.044) (0.047) (0.047) (0.035) (0.034) (0.009)
Post x Contract Intensity 0.013 0.021 0.010 0.018 -0.009
(0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.022) (0.006)
Post x MFA Quota Bound -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.002
(0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.006)
Post x ∆ Production Subsidy 0.041 0.036 0.067 0.061 0.009
(0.226) (0.224) (0.190) (0.186) (0.023)
Post x ∆ Export License -0.014 -0.014 -0.005 -0.005 0.000
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002)
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.35
N 680 680 680 680 680 680 680
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered at the prefecture level. The dependent variables are:
the migration rate of hukou (cross-province) migrants PLUS non-hukou (cross-province and cross-prefecture)
migrants (columns (1)-(3)); migration rate of all (cross-province and cross-prefecture) non-hukou migrants
(NHM in column (4)); migration rate of cross-province hukou PLUS non-hukou migrants (Prov NHM + HM
in column (5)); cross-province non-hukou migrants (Prov NHM in column (6)); and cross-province hukou
migrants (Prov HM in column (7)). The “pre-treatment” period is 2000 and the “post-treatment” is 2005.
The sample includes 340 prefectures with consistent boundaries from 1990 to 2005. Refer to main text for
the definition and construction of the explanatory variables.
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Table C.4: Robustness Check: migration rate of all migrants (hukou PLUS non-hukou),
using alternative NTR gaps
Panel A: Alternative measures of NTR gaps
Trade US Trade World Trade World Employment
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x NTR gap 0.070 0.057 0.087 0.178
(0.039)* (0.030)* (0.050)* (0.077)**
Controls for tariffs and NTBs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for p.c. GDP No No No No
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Cluster Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.91
N 680 680 680 644
Panel B: Different specifications
Control for Control for SE clustered at Spatial Error Spatial Durbin
per capita GDP Post*Exp province level Model Error Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post x NTR gap 0.055 0.056 0.052 0.035 0.034
(0.027)** (0.027)** (0.029)* (0.018)* (0.018)*
Controls for tariffs and NTBs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for p.c. GDP Yes No No No No
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Cluster Prefecture Prefecture Province Spatial Error Spatial Error
Adjusted R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.04 0.10
N 664 664 680 668 668
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: This table shows robustness checks of the baseline specification. The dependent variable is the migra-
tion rate of hukou (cross-province) migrants PLUS non-hukou migrants. In Panel A, alternative measures
of NTR gaps are used. In the first column, prefecture-level NTR gaps are simple averages of NTR gaps of
products exported to the US, and the prefecture-level import and export tariff rates are simple averages of
tariff rates of products imported and exported by each prefecture. In the second column, prefecture-level
NTR gaps are weighted averages of NTR gaps of products exported to the world, and the prefecture-level
import and export tariff rates are weighted averages of tariff rates of products imported and exported by
each prefecture. In the third column, prefecture-level NTR gaps are simple averages of NTR gaps of products
exported to the world, and the prefecture-level import and export tariff rates are simple averages of tariff
rates of products imported and exported by each prefecture. Panel B presents 5 alternative specifications:
controlling for GDP per capita in (1), controlling for share of exports in (2), clustering standard errors at
the province level in (3), including spatially correlated errors in (4) and (5). Note that results columns (4)
and (5) in panel B come from spatial regressions on the first difference specification. The sample size in
columns (1) and (2) is smaller due to missing GDP measures in 8 prefectures, while the sample size in (4)
and (5) is smaller due to concordance issues with the underlying geographic map. Control variables include
NTR rate, tariff abroad, import tariff, contract intensity, MFA quota bound, production subsidy, and export
licensing. Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered at the prefecture level except in B(3).
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Table C.5: Log Export to US
by product by product and prefecture
Export destination US US & HK US US & HK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x NTR gap 0.019 0.023 0.020 0.016
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
(number of FE) (2) (2) (2) (2)
Product fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
(number of FE) (4,835) (4,835) (4,835) (4,835)
Prefecture FE No No Yes Yes
(number of FE) – – (330) (330)
SE Cluster Product Product Prefecture Prefecture
Adjusted R-squared 0.77 0.73 0.33 0.36
N 9,670 9,670 761,436 761,436
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is the 6-digit HS product-level average annual log export
values to the U.S. during 1997-2000 and 2002-2006. In columns (3)-(4), the dependent variable is the
prefecture-by-product-level average annual log export values to the U.S. during 1997-2000 and 2002-2006.
Huber-White SEs are reported in parentheses, and they are clustered at the product level in columns (1)-(2),
and at the prefecture level in columns (3)-(4). “Controls” include NTR rate, tariff abroad, import tariff,
contract intensity, MFA quota bound, production subsidy, and export licensing. Note that in all columns,
we use the DID interaction of “Post” and changes in policies as in the main specification (Table 3 in main
text).
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Table C.6: Heterogeneous effects: migration rate of all migrants (hukou PLUS non-hukou)
by NTR gap quintiles
Dependent variable: Migration rate of NHM+HM
1st Quintile: Post x NTR gap 0.173
(0.217)
2nd Quintile: Post x NTR gap 0.023
(0.082)
3rd Quintile: Post x NTR gap 0.054
(0.050)
4th Quintile: Post x NTR gap 0.052
(0.042)
5th Quintile: Post x NTR gap 0.051
(0.031)*
Controls Yes




* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: This table presents the non-linear effects of trade policy changes on migration rates. 340 prefectures
are grouped into quintiles of treatment groups. All specifications include prefecture and time fixed effects.
The dependent variable is the migration rate of hukou (cross-province) migrants PLUS non-hukou (cross-
prefecture) migrants. Control variables include NTR rate, tariff abroad, import tariff, contract intensity,
MFA quota bound, production subsidy, and export licensing. Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered
at the prefecture level.
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Table C.7: Heterogeneous effects: migration rates by gender, age, and urban status
Panel A: By gender
Dependent variable: Male Female Total
NHM+HM (1) (2) (3)
Post x NTR gap 0.051 0.038 0.046
(0.026)** (0.020)* (0.022)**
Controls for tariffs and NTBs Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.90 0.92 0.92
N 680 680 680
Panel C: Males by age group
Dependent variable: 16-25 26-40 41-55 56-65
NHM+HM (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x NTR gap 0.071 0.074 0.031 -0.013
(0.043) (0.034)** (0.021) (0.038)
Controls for tariffs and NTBs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.72
N 680 680 680 680
Panel B: Males by type of hukou at origin
Dependent variable: Urban Rural Total
NHM (1) (2) (3)
Post x NTR gap 0.080 0.035 0.049
(0.034)** (0.032) (0.025)*
Controls for tariffs and NTBs Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.90 0.91
N 680 680 680
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered at the prefecture level. All specifications include
prefecture and time fixed effects. Sample includes 340 prefectures observed in 2000 and 2005. The dependent
variables are migration rates of hukou (cross-province) migrants PLUS non-hukou (cross-prefecture) migrants
(NHM+HM) by gender in panel A, by age groups in panel B, and migration rates of non-hukou (cross-
prefecture) migrants (NHM) by type of hukou at origin in panel C. We use the NTR gaps and other trade
policy changes from the main specification (Table 3 in main text) for all columns, ie, trade policy changes
are not specific to demographic groups. Control variables include NTR rate, tariff abroad, import tariff,
contract intensity, MFA quota bound, production subsidy, and export licensing.
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Table C.8: Migration rate of all migrants (hukou PLUS non-hukou) by skill
Dependent variable: Same NTR gaps Specific NTR gaps
NHM+HM Unskilled Skilled Unskilled Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x NTR gap 0.034 0.092 0.026 0.059
(0.028) (0.050)* (0.029) (0.031)*
Controls for tariffs and NTBs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Adjusted R-squared 0.90 0.76 0.90 0.76
N 680 680 680 680
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Huber-White SEs (in parentheses) are clustered at the prefecture level. All specifications include
prefecture and time fixed effects. The dependent variable is the migration rate of hukou (cross-province)
migrants and non-hukou (cross-prefecture) migrants by skill types. Skilled workers are those who completed
at least high school education, and skilled sectors are ones that uses skilled workers intensively. The sample
includes unskilled sectors (Columns (1) and (3)) and skilled sectors (Columns (2) and (4)) in 340 prefectures,
observed at 2000 and 2005. In Columns (1)-(2), we use the same NTR gaps for both skill groups, ie, not
skill-specific, while in Columns (3)-(4), we use skill-specific NTR gaps and other trade measures for each
skill group. The other explanatory variables are constructed similarly; they include NTR rate, tariff abroad,
import tariff, contract intensity, MFA quota bound, production subsidy, and export licensing.
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